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ACHIEVING FEDERAL-STATE COORDINATION IN
COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
MARC J. HERSHMAN*
As the use of coastal resources increases,I conflict increases among
users, between users and government, within government, and be-
tween different levels of government. The last of these types of
conflict, that occurring between levels of government as to jurisdic-
tion over particular resource allocations, is the concern of this Arti-
cle. The leading questions relate to the level of government deciding
resource issues pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972 (CZMA).2 The issue of primary concern is the relationship
between state and federal agencies.3
* B.A., J.D., Temple University. Associate Professor of Law and Marine Sciences, Louis-
iana State University; Research Director, Louisiana State University Sea Grant Legal Pro-
gram.
Ed.-A portion of this Article was prepared while the author was a Visiting Professor at
the Institute for Marine Studies, Division of Marine Resources, and Law School, University
of Washington, Seattle. The author acknowledges the partial support of the Louisiana State
University and University of Washington Sea Grant Programs (National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, United States Department of Commerce), the assistance of the Louis-
iana State Planning Office, and the research assistance.of Ms. Elizabeth Williams.
1. See COMMISSON ON MARNt SCINCE, ENGINEERING AND REsouRCEs, Oun NATION AND THE
SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1969); U.S. DEP'T OF Tm INTERIOR, NATIONAL ESTUARY
STuDY, H.R. Doe. Nos. 274 & 286, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971); Tan WATE's EDGE (B.
Ketchum ed. 1972). For evidence of pressures to increase use of fishery, mineral, and transpor-
tation resources, see U.S. Dep't of Commerce, A Draft Outline for the National Fisheries
Plan, August 1974, at 7-15; U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Proposed Outer Continental Shelf
Planning Schedule, June 1975; U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Deepwater Ports: Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,956-78 (1975).
The apparent inability of the Third Law of the Sea Convention to agree upon a comprehen-
sive treaty to regulate use and conservation of ocean resources and ocean space may lead the
Congress to extend United States jurisdiction for economic resource activity 200 miles from
the coast. See generally S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (200-mile fisheries zone); S. 1341,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (200-mile marine pollution control zone). For discussion of the
200-mile limit see Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the
Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 569 (1975).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. 11, 1972). See 15 C.F.R. § 920 (1973) (coastal zone manage-
ment program development regulations); 40 Fed. Reg. 1683-95 (1975) (program approval
regulations); 40 Fed. Reg. 8546-48 (1975) (proposed federal-state cooperation regulations). Cf.
Zile, A Legislative-Political History of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 1 COASTAL
ZONE MGMT. J. 235 (1974).
3. Relations between other levels of government, such as a state's relationship with its local
and regional entities, or a multistate regional body's relationship with state government are
sufficiently important to warrant separate analysis. See Brewer, The Concept of State and
Local Relations Under the CZMA, 16 WM. & MARY L. REv. 717 (1975); Koppelman, Models
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Four major facility developments in the coastal zone will be ad-
dressed as examples of these problems of federal-state relations.'
The Trident nuclear submarine base to be built in Bangor, Wash-
ington, on Puget Sound involves a substantial commitment of
shoreline and portends increased impacts upon the population and
character of a prime rural boating and fishing area. Opposition to
the proposed lease-sale of outer continental shelf areas off Southern
California for drilling oil and gas wells has resulted in a law suit,
moratorium bills in the state legislature, and a strong energy ele-
ment in the proposed California coastal plan. The deepwater port
proposed for Louisiana generated debate concerning environmental
protection efforts, the onshore secondary impacts, and the appropri-
ate role for state government in site selection. Along the East Coast
states have sought direct participation in the management of fed-
eral offshore leasing and a share of revenues or impact payments
from oil and gas operations.
These four issues are chosen as examples of federal-state relation-
ships for a variety of reasons. The primary reason is that each is a
documented example of an alternative role for states in coastal re-
source decisionmaking formerly conducted almost exclusively at the
federal level. The possibility of new aggressiveness5 by the states
for Implementing the CZMA's Concept of State-Local Relations, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 731
(1975).
4. Key facility-development issues rather than smaller scale issues concerning marinas,
second homes, and jetties were chosen to illustrate federal-state relations although the issues
raised by large and small developments are similar. The larger issues tend to receive more
attention, with the result that the issues are more carefully developed and articulated.
Smaller scale issues are more numerous and more difficult to analyze because they are
handled rapidly by local officials and reported in scattered records.
Fruitful research could be conducted on federal-state relations in smaller scale coastal
issues. One hypothesis worth testing is that federal agencies are more likely to accommodate
state and local preferences when the scale of the issue is small and its impact "local," despite
clear federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 19,768 (1975) (Corps of Engineers proposal,
one of four alternatives, that a favorable state determination with respect to a particular class
of permit requests be given "heavy" weight in favor of issuing a Corps permit, rather than
being treated as only evidence of local public interest in the overall decisionmaking process).
See also Hershman & Folkenroth, Coastal Zone Management and Intergovernmental
Coordination, 54 ORE. L. Rav. 13 (1975) (discussing primarily examples of the smaller scale
dredge-and-fill projects).
5. One writer concluded, with respect to the involvement of states in federal outer conti-
nental shelf leasing: "They are mobilizing a united front on a state level, recruiting blocs of
Members of Congress to support them, such as the New England Congressional Caucus, and
seeking to make the case that without adequate planning and safeguards, OCS development
in frontier areas could be an economic and environmental nightmare." Magida, Environment
Report/Coastal states seek changes in OCS leasing policy, 7 NAT'L J. REPoRTS 229, 239 (1975).
[Vol. 16:747
19751 FEDERAL-STATE COORDINATION
may have national policy implications for the allocation of natural
resources, especially if there is a trend toward more state involve-
ment and less federal presence in certain types of resource manage-
ment programs.6 The fact that states are beginning to obtain ap-
proval for coastal zone management programs pursuant to the
Coastal Zone Management Act lends impetus to the creation of
procedures that will assure effective federal-state coordination, and
analysis of these four issues is helpful in identifying these proce-
dures.
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS UNDER THE CZMA
The federal-state relations question arises from basic principles in
the United States Constitution and from the need to accommodate
national, state, and local needs in resource allocation. Two sover-
eign governments exercise powers over any particular geographical
area, the government of the United States and the government of
some state. The Constitution provides, however, that federal law is
supreme, state statutes to the contrary notwithstanding 7 Allocation
of responsibility between the two sovereigns has been addressed
often in statutes and court decisions. As to control of water quality,
for example, this federal-state relationship is being more clearly
defined8 than it is regarding the control of dredge-and-fill activities.9
6. Although the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (Supp. II, 1972),
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(Supp. II, 1972), significantly increased federal control in these two areas of environmental
protection, the different degrees of state aggressiveness regarding the four major facility
developments discussed in this Article suggest that state participation will vary with the
type of resource issue. One possible cause for increased state involvement is the impact of
the four proposed projects on socio-economic and land use factors, areas traditionally under
state and local control. The identification of any reliable trends in relative degrees of federal-
state influence in resource and environment issues, however, would require a much broader
survey of recent legislative and judicial initiatives.
7. U.S. COaSu. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. See California ex reL State Water Resources Control Board v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 511 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S. May 14,
1975) (No. 741435) (interpreting provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 11, 1972), and holding that federal agencies must comply with
substantive and procedural requirements of state water pollution control programs).
9. The basic authority for the issuance of permits by the Corps of Engineers for dredge-
and-fill activities, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. I1, 1972), does not mention state and local govern-
ment involvement in decisionmaking. In light of the pressures of state and local agencies for
increased involvement and the requirements of new environmental legislation, the Corps uses
state and local advice in its decisionmaking. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120 (1974), amendments
proposed, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,766-94 (1975), & authorities cited therein.
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However Congress defines the relationship, courts frequently must
determine whether a particular state action comports with the Con-
stitution or the intent of Congress. 0
Resource allocation is a fertile field for federal-state conflict. For
example, interests in mineral-rich states have disputed the author-
ity of the Federal Power Commission (FP0) to allocate natural gas
when supplies are short." East Coast states likewise have argued
that the protection of recreational beaches and vacation homes re-
quires state participation in any decision to accelerate development
of oil and gas reserves on the outer continental shelf because of the
risk of oil spills or unwanted commerce and industry. 12
One commentator has suggested that interposing state govern-
ment into resource management merely postpones a decision that
ultimately must be made on the national level.1 3 As resources dwin-
dle, it is argued that perception of the national interest in these
resources will grow, and the need for a national resource allocation
program will be recognized as necessary to protect the environ-
ment.'4 According to this line of argument, the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act, in its attempt to encourage state control of land and
water uses in the coastal zone, is a stopgap which finally will yield
to federal dominance as demands upon coastal resources intensify.
Federal dominance is inevitable, however, only if state and local
governments are ineffective, and there is reason to believe that these
10. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (aircraft
noise control under exclusive federal control); Askew v. American Waterway Operators, Inc.,
411 U.S. 325 (1973) (state oil pollution control program may coexist with federal programs);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (city smoke abatement
code applicable to federally licensed and inspected ship); Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (radiation pollution
control under exclusive federal control).
11. One aspect of this issue was decided in FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S.
621 (1972) (upholding FPC jurisdiction to regulate direct-sales deliveries in times of natural
gas shortage).
12. Magida, supra note 5, at 229.
13. Carver, The Trend to State Protectionism in Natural Resource Management, RocKY
MT. MINERAL INsr. 253, 265 (1972).
14. The issue is stated as follows:
Can Maine, a "producing" state of the resource of unspoiled coast line, keep
interstate commerce out of its borders? Obviously it can until the resource of
access to water (at spoiled or unspoiled coast lines) becomes critically short.
When the national interest is perceived in such critical terms, the choice will
have to be made between Delaware Bays, figuratively speaking, which are al-
ready developed, and the undeveloped areas, and these will be hard choices.
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governments can be at least as effective as federal decisionmakers.
State and local governments have the capability to apportion re-
source use through the acquisition or regulation of land and other
resources to balance competing state and local interests. 5 Further,
state and local governments have an important resource-allocation
function where resource conflicts have not yet become interstate
issues. Moreover, the argument that all resource allocation must be
performed at the federal level assumes that federal agents are the
only officials competent to make decisions in the national interest,
that the national interest cannot be considered adequately at a
lower level of government, and that where there is no expressed
national policy federal agencies will best fill the-policy vacuum."
Likewise, it does not admit that a program for managing a particu-
lar resource may entail decisionmaking at different levels of govern-
ment to reflect the concerns. of different communities or groups.
Finally, federal dominance is not inevitable so long as there exists
the possibility that technology will relieve the pressure toward
scarcity by providing alternative resources and resource uses.
Not only is federal dominance of resource allocation not
inevitable, federal agencies may be less capable than the state to
make the allocations. State governments have the legal competence,
fiscal control, and political organization needed to manage re-
sources, and they are developing these capabilities to provide new
land use controls and coastal management programs.17 Technical
expertise needed to develop policies and programs is available to
state governments from resource agencies and state universities.
While the vital issues of environmental quality, resource conserva-
tion, and private property rights may be asserted with more imme-
diacy in state structures and legislatures than in distant federal
agencies, state decisionmakers also are insulated more adequately
from the parochial interests that may dominate local governments.
15. Local governments traditionally have exercised the powers of land use control. See
Brewer, supra note 3, at 722-23.
16. California has argued that the state need not accept further outer continental shelf oil
and gas development until a comprehensive national energy study demonstrates the need for
Southern California OCS development according to clearly defined national interests. See
note 53 infra & accompanying text.
17. See F. BossELM & D. CALi.Es, "au Qmur R vOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971);
E. BRADLEY & J. AnsTRoNG, A DEscRmloN AND ANALySIS OF COASTAL ZoNm AND SHORELINE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS N THE UNrrED STATES (Sea Grant Program, University of Michigan,
Technical Report No. 20, 1972); CoASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT INSTrTUT, COASTAL ZONE MAN-
AGEMENT: THE PROCESS OF PORAMi DEvELOpMENT, app. A (1974).
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The state thus has an essential role as an operative arm of national
policy and as a focal point for the accommodation of national policy
and local concerns.
This role is recognized in the manner in which the Coastal Zone
Management Act addresses the allocation of coastal zone resources,
the competence of different levels of government to make allocation
decisions, and the procedures for coordinating the concerns of the
different levels of government. The CZMA provides for state deter-
mination of the boundaries for the coastal zone, of the permissible
land and water uses in the zone, and of guidelines for such uses in
particular areas of the zone. 18 These determinations are to be in-
cluded in a coastal management program implemented under state
law9 and created with the full cooperation, coordination, and prior
review of federal agencies and local governments." "[N]ational
interest involved in the siting of facilities necessary to meet require-
ments which are other than local in nature" must be considered
fully in the development of a state program.21
Once a state's program is approved by the Secretary of Com-
merce,2 four "federal consistency" provisions of the Act become
effective. The first requires that federal agencies "conducting or
supporting" activities which directly affect the state's coastal zone
must, to the maximum extent practicable, conduct or support those
activities in a manner which is consistent with the state's approved
coastal management program.2s Second, federal development pro-
jects within the coastal zone of a particular state must be consistent
with the state's program, to the maximum extent practicable. 2
Third, applicants for federal licenses or permits must obtain certifi-
cation that the proposed action is consistent with a state's pro-
gram.2- Fourth, state and local government applicants for federal
grants must show that proposed projects are consistent with the
management program.21
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
19. Id. § 1455(c).
20. Id. §§ 1455(c)(2), 1456(a),(b).
21. Id. § 1455(c)(8). Cf. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Adequate Consideration of the National
Interest in Coastal Zone Management (undated memorandum provided as guidance to states
for interpretation of the national-interest clause).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (Supp. 11, 1972).
23. Id. § 1456(c)(1).
24. Id. § 1456(c)(2).
25. Id. § 1456(c)(3).
26. Id. § 1456(d).
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The key provisions, then, for addressing federal-state relations
concerning the coastal zone are the national-interest clause, which
requires states to consider national interests in the establishment of
their programs, the requirement that federal agencies review a
state's program prior to its approval, and the federal-consistency
provisions, which require federal agencies to act in a manner which
is consistent with the state interests expressed in approved manage-
ment programs. An examination of four major facility developments
will indicate some problems in the effectuation of these provisions.
FouR MAJOR FACILITY DEVELOPMENTS
Trident Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington
The first example of the handling of a federal-state controversy
concerns the Trident Submarine Base proposed for Bangor, Wash-
ington, in Kitsap County.Y This Navy "refit" complex, intended to
support nuclear submarines patrolling in the Pacific, would use
6,929 acres of land and nearly four miles of shoreline. Located
wholly on an existing federal installation which borders on Hood
Canal, a prime recreational area in Puget Sound, it will entail ex-
tensive shoreline development for activities such as submarine
docking, wetberthing, maintenance, and reprovisioning.2 1 Increased
27. For a general description of the project and potential impacts, see Dep't of the Navy,
Trident Support Site Final Environmental Impact Statement (July 1974). See also Comptrol-
ler General, Summary of GAO's Study of Factors Considered by the Navy in Selecting a Site
for the Trident Support Complex, Nov. 14, 1973; Congressional Research Service, The
Trident Program, Oct. 15, 1973. The author thanks David Schnapf for his assistance on
Trident-related issues.
28. The Navy described the project as follows:
The waterfront installations will include two Refit Piers, a Drydock and Service
Pier, two Explosive Handling Piers, and a degaussing/deperming facility. The
Refit Pier-Drydock area will service and maintain the submarines while the
Explosive Handling Piers will serve the missiles. The proposed Refit Piers are
660-foot wharves, approximately 75-feet wide with a 90-foot wide berth. The
Drydock will be 690-feet long and 100-feet wide, with a 60-foot deep, 90-foot wide
berth. These piers will be located a minimum of 700 feet from the shoreline and
will extend to a depth of approximately 110 feet of water. Drydock service
facilities, storage buildings for hatch covers and a transit shed will be supplied
for each pier. Serving both the Refit Piers and the Drydock are a SUBSAT
(Submarine Supply Assistance Team) Building and a machine shop. In addi-
tion, a two-story industrial support facility will be located on the refit/drydock
piers.
The two Explosive Handling Piers (EHP) are 630-foot long combined quays
and piers with 460-foot long covers which will be approximately 120 feet high.
Minimum required water depth at the berth is 43 feet. These covered berths
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impacts are expected from shoreline construction and induced eco-
nomic and population shifts in Kitsap County. Anticipating consid-
erable Trident-related growth, local officials in Kitsap County
campaigned for federal funds with which to meet planning and pub-
lic facility needs.29
In late 1973 and early 1974 this campaign, involving local officials,
Washington State Congressmen, and officials of the Navy and De-
partment of Defense, had two results. First, the Secretary of De-
fense, as Chairman of the Inter-Agency Economic Adjustment Com-
mittee established to direct federal efforts to alleviate economic
difficulties associated with military bases,3" declared Kitsap County
a Defense Impact Area.3' He accordingly urged the Under Secretar-
ies Group for Regional Operations, 3 which supervises and provides
policy guidance to Federal Regional Councils, 3 to have the Seattle-
based Federal Regional Council accord Trident-related impact
studies and adjustment programs funding priority.34 As a
consequence, all federal funds expended through April 1975 on
Trident-related projects came from existing federal agency chan-
nels." Second, a section was added to the Military Construction
Authorization Act of 197536 allowing the Secretary of Defense to use
have the capability for all-weather explosive handling operations-the on/off
loading of missiles and other ordnance devices. There will be road access to the
piers via a trestle. Also included is a Dockside Handling Building (DHB) with
floor space of about 9,40D square feet, to handle the missiles, liners, and WEC
hoist.
The degaussing/deperming facility with their respective operations and sup-
port buildings will also be located at the waterfront. The Deperming Berth will
be a 650-foot long pier with cable runs to the pier and to underwater instruments
to monitor the ships.
Dep't of the Navy, supra note 27, at 11-12.
29. Telephone interview with John Hoursley, Kitsap County Planning Commission, Apr.
10, 1975. Early attempts to persuade the Navy consultants to use local government planning
staffs to assist in assessing social, economic, and environmental impacts were unsuccessful.
Id.
30. 9 WEEKLY CoNp. PRES. Doc. 317-318 (1970).
31. Interview, supra note 29.
32. See Exec. Order No. 11,647, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,731, 3 C.F.R. 335-37
(1974).
33. Id. See generally U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-95, Nov. 13,
1973.
34. Interview, supra note 29.
35. Id.
36. Pub. L. No. 93-552, § 608, 88 Stat. 1763, provides:
Sec. 608. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to assist communities
located near the TRIDENT Support Site Bangor, Washington, in meeting the
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Trident project development and construction funds to meet costs
of increased municipal services and facilities for communities near
the Trident support site, to the extent that funds were unavailable
under other federal programs. These funds have not yet been used
because existing federal funding has been adequate.3 7
These developments regarding the Trident base have come about
through direct local-federal coordination with little resort to the
Washington Shorelines Management Act,3 the major component of
the state coastal management program, despite the obvious impact
of the base upon the state's coastal zone. A lack of statutory author-
ity appears responsible for this bypassing of the Act. Because the
Act neither lists federal agencies as "persons" subject to the Act"
nor specifically excludes federal lands from its coverage,"0 local gov-
costs of providing increased municipal services and facilities to the residents of
such communities, if the Secretary determines that there is an immediate and
substantial increase in the need for such services and facilities in such communi-
ties as a direct result of work being carried out in connection with the construc-
tion, installation, testing, and operation of the TRIDENT Weapon System and
that an unfair and excessive financial burden will be incurred by such communi-
ties as a result of the increased need for such services and facilities.
(b) The Secretary of Defense shall carry out the provisions of this section
through existing Federal programs. The Secretary is authorized to supplement
funds made available under such Federal programs to the extent necessary to
carry out the provisions of this section, and is authorized to provide financial
assistance to communities described in subsection (a) of this section to help
such communities pay their share of the costs under such programs. The heads
of all departments and agencies concerned shall cooperate fully with the Secre-
tary of Defense in carrying out the provisions of this section on a priority basis.
(c) In determining the amount of financial assistance to be made available
under this section to any local community for any community service or facility,
the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the head of the department or agency
of the Federal Government concerned with the type of service or facility for
which financial assistance is being made available and shall take into considera-
tion (1) the time lag between the initial impact of increased population in any
such community and any increase in the local tax base which will result from
such increased population, (2) the possible temporary nature of the increased
population and the long-range cost impact on the permanent residents of any
such community, and (3) such other pertinent factors as the Secretary of De-
fense deems appropriate.
This language was taken almost verbatim from a provision in the Military Construction
Authorization Act of 1971 dealing with communities affected by the Safeguard Anti-ballistic
Missile System. Pub. L. No. 91-511, § 610, 84 Stat. 1224.
37. Interview, supra note 29.
38. WASH. REV. CODnE ANN. § 90.58 (Supp. 1974); cf. Final Guidelines, Shoreline Manage-
ment Act, WASH. Arnm. CODE § 1"3-16 (1972).
39. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.58.030(!)(d) (Supp. 1974).
40. See id. § 90.58.260 (requiring certain state agencies to represent the state's interests
before appropriate federal agencies to protect state shoreline use policies).
1975]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ernments could include federally owned areas in their own coastal
programs pursuant to the Act, but they would have no ability to
enforce their plans through permit requirements.4' Further, because
local governments, rather than any statewide body, have the pri-
mary responsibility to plan, pursuant to state guidelines, for shore-
lines of significance to the state generally,4 2 including Hood Canal
from the mean high tide line seaward,43 there appears to be no way
to plan at the state level for the use of Hood Canal shorelands and
submerged lands, except through local governments. Nonetheless,
the state, rather than any locality, has the sole statutory authority
to deal with federal agencies," although the statute relies upon local
coastal programs to incorporate statewide interests. Thus there ap-
pears to be both a lack of authority to control federal actions by local
permit and a lack of authority to plan effectively at the state level
for use of shorelines of statewide significance. Accordingly, the state
management program in Washington seems legally incapable of
playing an important role regarding the Trident facility.
OCS Oil and Gas off California
In the wake of the "energy crisis" and official announcements of
accelerated outer continental shelf (OCS) oil and gas leasing off
California and elsewhere,4 5 Californians sought to assert influence
over lease-sale decisions through litigation," passing resolutions, 7
41. Federal agencies argue that, although they will comply with substantive provisions of
state environmental and land use laws, they should not be required to comply with adminis-
trative requirements such as permits. See Exec. Order No. 11,752, 3 C.F.R. 380, 381 (1974);
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4231(c) (1970) (federal aid consistent with
state and local planning); U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-95, Part II
(2)(a)(2), Nov. 13, 1973 (consistency of federal plans or projects with state, areawide, and
local development plans and programs). But see note 8 supra.
42. WASH. AssIIN. CODE § 173-16-040(5) (1972).
43. WASH. RPv. CODE §§ 90.58.030(2)(e)(ii),(iii) (Supp. 1974).
44. Id. § 90.58.260.
45. See FEDE AL ENERGY ADwMiSTmN, Pnojcr I NEPEND CE REPORT (1974).
46. California ex reL Younger v. Morton, Civil No. 74-2374 (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 15, 1974).
47. Five resolutions, including two from the California Assembly, two from the City of
Santa Barbara, and one from the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission are
reprinted in SENATE COhiM. ON COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., OUTER CONTIErrAL SHELF
OIL AND GAs LEsNG OFF SouTmER CAIFORNIA: ANALYsis OF IssuEs, app. A (Comm. Print
1974).
[Vol. 16:747
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legislation,48 and administrative action.49 The coastal plan" now
being prepared by the state Coastal Zone Conservation Commis-
sions,5 may prove to be one method for regulating oil and gas
development and for involving the state in the federal decision-
making process.
The Preliminary Coastal Plan contains a lengthy and detailed
energy element for energy conservation, alternative energy sources,
power plants, petroleum development, refineries, tanker terminals,
and liquified natural gas facilities. 2 Policies expressed in the energy
element address both the need for offshore development and tech-
niques for its control if a need is demonstrated. The Plan states that
new state or federal OCS production should proceed only if shown
to be necessary for the needs of California and the Southwest or if
clearly identified as an integral part of a balanced national energy
program with acceptable onshore impacts comporting with other
elements of the Plan." If drilling does occur on the outer continental
shelf, the Plan suggests certain protective measures, including the
following: submission of one-, five-, and ten-year plans to appropri-
ate state agencies for exploration, production, and related onshore
and offshore development if drilling is successful; maximum feasi-
ble consolidation of drilling, production, and other facilities to re-
duce the number of wells and support facilities; subsea completion
of wells and submerged production systems where feasible; use of
platforms rather than islands where safety conditions permit; dis-
closure of exploration and production data; revenue-sharing with
California and other coastal states from outer continental shelf roy-
alties; and designation of sanctuary areas where drilling would not
48. Assembly Bill 180, 1975-76 Cal. Legis. (1975) (prohibiting construction of oil and gas
pipelines on or across submerged lands without permit until a coastal plan is adopted or Dec.
31, 1977, whichever occurs first). California Congressmen also have advocated national legis-
lation designed to increase state control over oil and gas drilling. See S. 81, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1975); H.R. 1236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
49. A newly appointed three-member California Lands Commission disapproved several
new oil drilling projects in the Santa Barbara Channel in January 1975. BNA, ENV. REP.,
CunmirRr DEVELOPMENTS 1485 (1975). Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., has urged the Califor-
nia congressional delegation to insist that there be no national OCS leasing until there is
congressional action to ensure state involvement or until the end of 1976 when the California
legislature would have had time to adopt a state coastal management program. 6 COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMEn, No. 23, at 5 (1975).
50. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commissions, Preliminary Coastal Plan (Hear-
ing Draft, March 1975) [hereinafter cited as California Plan].
51. See California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PuB. RES. CoDE §§ 27000-
27650 (West Supp. 1975).
52. California Plan, supra note 50, at 163-243.
53. Id. at 215, 216.
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occur because of geologic hazards or high recreation and esthetic
interests in adjacent shoreline communities. 4
California thus has written a policy blueprint for control of OCS
oil and gas development which can be advocated in negotiations
with the Department of the Interior.55 The energy element of the
Plan, if adopted by the California legislature,5 would be imple-
mented in part by the coastal agency and in part by a newly created
energy commission. 7 Accordingly the coastal management program
appears likely to be important to the shaping of federal-state rela-
tions in the development of the state's outer continental shelf.
Louisiana Deepwater Port
Political and economic leaders in Louisiana first discussed seri-
ously the need for a deepwater port in the Gulf of Merico when it
became apparent that oil tankers were growing in length and draft,
that imported oil was replacing domestically produced oil at an
increasing rate, and that channels were not sufficiently deep in
Louisiana to accommodate the larger tankers. In 1972 the Louisiana
Superport Task Force recommended the establishment of a new
agency to promote and regulate superport development in the state 8
based upon initial technical studies done by Louisiana State Uni-
versity. "
54. Id. at 216-223.
55. The debate between states and the federal government has been well documented. See
OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COASTAL MANAGEMENT As-
PECTS OF OCS OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENTS (January 1975) (containing substantial references,
a directory of agencies and organizations, and a detailed outline of issues); SNATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESs., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT AND
THE COASTAL ZONE (Comm. Print 1974); SENATE Comm. ON COMiMERCE, 93D CONG., 21 SEss.,
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING OFF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: ANALYSIS OP IssUES
(Comm. Print 1974); Magida, supra note 5; Kenworthy, Oil-Lease Debate Heats Up, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 23, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
56. Unless the California legislature adopts the Plan and establishes new authorities and
agencies by the end of the 1976 legislative session, current restrictions will expire. CAL. PUB.
REs. CODE § 27650 (West Supp. 1975).
57. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 25000-25903 (West Supp. 1975). The Coastal Plan recommends extending the au-
thority of the new energy commission to include all oil and gas production, processing and
transmission facilities, and power plants, while allowing the coastal agency concurrent au-
thority over the land use and environmental aspects of facilities located in whole or in part
in the coastal zone. The coastal agency also would participate fully with the energy commis-
sion during initial planning stages. California Plan, supra note 50, at 200-01.
58. LOUISIANA SUPERPORT TASK FORCE, A SUPERPORT FOR LOUISIANA (1972).
59. Louisiana State University Center for Wetland Resources, Preliminary Recominenda-
tions and Data Analysis 1-10 (Louisiana Superport Studies Rep. No. 1, 1972).
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In the same year the Louisiana Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal
Authority, subsequently renamed the Offshore Terminal Authority,
was created."0 In addition to promoting offshore port development,
it was given the task of preparing an Environmental Protection Plan
within 18 months of the establishment of the Authority." The Plan
adopted by the Authority in January 19742 provides substantial
policy and technical guidance with respect to distinct aspects of
land and water impacts from port development: economic and envi-
ronmental considerations in the selection of sites for the port and
related facilities; criteria for the design of port-related facilities in-
cluding consideration of multiple uses and growth containment;
procedures for ensuring that port operations are safe and result in
minimal environmental pollution; establishment of compensation
charges and an environmental protection fund to offset any una-
voidable environmental disturbances; and requirements for ongoing
coordination with other federal and state agencies, especially the
state agency responsible for creation of the Louisiana coastal zone
management plan. 3
While the state was preparing its Environmental Protection Plan,
Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, Inc. (LOOP), initiated its own stud-
ies." It argued that its concept and design for a single purpose crude
oil importing facility, owned and operated by industry rather than
a public authority, would be in the best interest of Louisiana and
the nation. 5
Partially as a result of such conflicting private and public efforts,
Congress enacted the Deepwater Port Act of 1974,06 under which
proposed regulations were published in May 1975.7 State participa-
tion in federal decisionmaling pursuant to the Act should be signifi-
cant: state governors may veto the siting of a port;8 states may
charge fees to recover certain administrative and environmental
60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:3101-16 (Supp. 1975).
61. Id. § 34:3113.
62. State of Louisiana Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal Authority, Superport Environ-
mental Protection Plan, Jan. 26, 1974.
63. LoujsrANA ADvisoRY ComMissioN ON COASTAL AND MAmNE RESOURCES, LOUISIANA WEr-
LANDS PROSPECTUS (1973).
64. See Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, Inc., Presentation to the Louisiana Deep Draft Harbor
and Terminal Authority, New Orleans, Mar. 30, 1975, at 13.
65. Id. at 6-7.
66. Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126.
67. Deepwater Ports: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,956-78 (1975).
68. Pub. L. No. 93-627, § 9(b)(1), 88 Stat. 2137.
1975]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
costs;6" states may receive licenses on a priority basis;7 adjacent
states must have received a coastal management planning grant;71
and a fund is established to compensate for damages from any oil
spills.72
Thus, most federal-state relations questions in connection with
deepwater port development will be handled within the context of
the new federal law and guidelines, although the role of any state
coastal management program still is undetermined. There are no
specific requirements in the Act for relying upon coastal manage-
ment programs, only generalizations about planning and coordina-
tion."3 In Louisiana the effort to promote and regulate potential
offshore ports has far outpaced creation of a coastal zone manage-
ment plan, unlike the states of Washington and California where
coastal zone management has begun to take form. One possibility
yet to be explored fully in Louisiana is the use of the Environmental
Protection Plan as an integral part of the management program for
those coastal areas affected by deepwater port development.
OCS Oil and Gas off the East Coast
East Coast states currently are battling the Department of the
Interior over accelerated outer continental shelf leasing proposals.74
The issues resemble those in California, but the fact that no drilling
has been conducted before in some eastern areas7 creates concern
that new classes of impacts will be felt onshore.76 Having now lost
69. Id. § 5(h)(2).
70. Id. § 5(i)(2).
71. Id. § 9(c).
72. Id. § 18.
73. Id. § 9(c).
74. All East Coast states do not see the issues or solutions similarly. For example, Maine's
Governor James B. Longley has taken a neutral position on the OCS issue. New Hampshire's
new Governor Meldrin Thompson is fully behind accelerated OCS leasing. Both stand quite
apart from other New England governors and governors of mid-Atlantic states. Telephone
interview with Alan Kaufman, Conservation Law Foundation, Boston, Apr. 22, 1975. There
are sufficient common elements of concern, however, to justify referring to an "East Coast"
approach to OCS issues.
75. Previously untapped "frontier" areas off the East Coast include the Baltimore Canyon
(extending from Long Island to North Carolina), Georges Bank (off New England), and the
South Atlantic (from northern Florida to the Carolinas). Magida, supra note 5, at 236-37.
76. A number of studies have attempted or are attempting to determine the effects of OCS
development. See, e.g., D. KASH & I. WHITE, ENERGY UNDER THE 0CEANS (1973); SNATE
COMIM. ON COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SEsS., NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS: IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT
ON THE COASTAL ZONE (Comm. Print 1974) (applying experience in Scotland to the East
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their claim to ownership of resources beyond the three-mile limit,7
the states are applying various collateral pressures upon the Depart-
ment of the Interior.
Since the areas to be leased generally lie offshore of more than one
East Coast state, there has been interest in interstate cooperation
to increase state participation in OCS leasing matters. In New
England, for example, two existing entities are involved in policy
coordination and technical studies respectively: the New England
Regional Commission and the New England River Basin Commis-
sion. 8 More recently a proposal has been circulating to establish a
New England Energy Authority, an interstate organization which
would buy and resell oil and gas rights to all of Georges Bank off
New England, imposing appropriate environmental conditions and
royalty payments on the resale.7 Governors of mid-Atlantic states
recently formed the Mid-Atlantic Governors' Coastal Resources
Council to act as a collective staff for the conduct of joint studies
to aid in presenting options and recommendations to the gover-
nors.80 Several Atlantic governors have jointly requested a number
of items such as formation of a comprehensive national energy pol-
icy, recognition of state environmental concerns, separation of ex-
ploration from production, creation of new institutions and financial
arrangements for OCS exploration and development, and full im-
plementation of the Coastal Zone Management Act. ' Additionally,
a proposal has surfaced to provide for complete consolidation of an
oil and gas producing area, the Baltimore Canyon for example, by
executing one lease to a consortium of oil companies that would buy
shares in the region in order to increase state control over the pacing
and siting of development. 2
Coast); U.S. CouNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrv, OCS OL AND GAS-AN ENVIRoNMNTAL
AssEssMErNT (1974); J. Goodman, Decisions for Delaware: Sea Grant Looks at OCS Develop-
ment, University of Delaware, Sea Grant Program, February 1975.
77. See United States v. Maine, 95 S. Ct. 1155 (1975).
78. Telephone interview with Henry Lee, Director of Massachusetts Energy Office, May
2, 1975; Telephone interview with Richard Dowd, Planning Director, Connecticut Dep't of
Environmental Protection, Apr. 25, 1975; Telephone interview with Alan Kaufman, Conser-
vation Law Foundation, Boston, Apr. 22, 1975. Comments as to the effectiveness of these two
organizations for bringing about regional cooperation were not optimistic.
79. R. Dowd & S. Weems, Controlling Georges Bank Oil and Gas Development: A Coopera-
tive New England Energy Authority, Draft of Feb. 28, 1975.
80. Telephone interview with Edward F. Wilson, Coordinator for OCS Activities, Com-
monwealth of Virginia, Apr. 25, 1975.
81. Policy Position on Energy and the Atlantic Continental Shelf, Jan. 31, 1975.
82. Telephone interview with Henry Lee, supra note 78.
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There have been two important federal responses to the initiatives
by the East Coast states. First, the Department of Interior has indi-
cated three areas in which it is willing to accept increased state
participation in OCS leasing: a national policy advisory board, sup-
plementing the existing technical advisory board, will be estab-
lished in the Department, to represent state government and federal
agencies, and to be organized into regional panels; there would be
a "pause" provided in leasing arrangements after exploration and
before production to allow close environmental review of actual de-
velopment plans for a leased tract by both federal and state agen-
cies; and the Interior Department would not object to a revenue-
sharing arrangement with states if it is fair to all states.3 Second,
Congress is giving serious attention to various revenue-sharing and
impact-compensation proposals, including the following: amend-
ment of the Coastal Zone Managment Act to provide greater state
control over oil and gas activities;8 amendment of the Coastal Zone
Management Act to provide greater state control of energy activities
and a coastal impact fund to offset costs associated with energy-
related impacts;" amendment of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA) to increase state involvement in decisionmaking; 5
amendment of OCSLA to establish a fund to compensate impacts
from anticipated or actual oil and gas production;87 amendment of
OCSLA to provide a fund from which to pay damages from oil
spills;88 and an OCS-revenue-sharing bill providing preferential
treatment to coastal states. It is likely that the combined efforts
of East and West Coast Congressmen will lead to enactment of
legislation providing state participation in decisionmaking and
revenue-sharing.
The pressures exerted by the East Coast states generally tend
toward the creation of new laws and institutions to address OCS-
related problems; only a cautious optimism is expressed in those
states that comprehensive coastal management programs will play
83. Statement of Darius W. Gaskins, OCS Program Coordinator, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Third Annual Coastal Zone Management Conference, Asilomar, Cal., May 28, 1975.
84. S. 81, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 1236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
85. S. 586, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3981, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
86. H.R. 6218, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
87. S. 521, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
88. S. 426, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
89. S. 130, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 376, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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a key role in the resolution of those problems." A complicating
factor is the history of coastal legislation on the East Coast where
the presence of extensive marshes and beach dunes and the long-
standing pressures for development of these coastal areas have re-
sulted in the enactment of numerous special-purpose laws."1 East
Coast states may well deal with coastal management by coordinat-
ing these laws, as has been done in Maine which has four important
coastal laws,92 while leaving energy-related problems to new institu-
tions.
EMERGING THEMES FOR ONGOIN COORDINATION
Because of the potential usefulness of the CZMA's national-
interest and federal-consistency provisions for dealing with federal-
state relations questions in coastal resources issues,93 it is appropri-
ate to consider the role of state coastal zone management programs
evolving from the experiences in Washington, California, Louisiana,
and on the East Coast. Although these experiences have been too
limited in both duration and number to allow conclusive assessment
of the future role for coastal zone management,4 some observations
are possible.
First, states differ significantly in the degree to which emerging
coastal management programs are used to assert influence over
major facility developments. The State of Washington Shoreline
Management Program has been all but ignored in the Trident nu-
clear submarine base controversy as direct local-federal coordina-
tion has displaced state participation, largely because of deficien-
90. Interviews with Henry Lee, Richard Dowd, Alan Kaufman, supra note 78. Telephone
interview with James L Jones, Chairman of Florida Outer Continental Shelf Committee, Apr.
25, 1975.
91. Partial compilations of state coastal laws include E. BRADLEY & J. APtusrONG, supra
note 17; U.S. DEP'T OF CormERCE, STATE COASTAL ZoNEMANAcRmar AoTrvrMEs-1974 (1974);
Ausness, A Survey of State Regulation of Dredge and Fill Operations in Nonnavigable
Waters, 8 LAND & WATER L. REv. 65 (1973); Robbins & Hershman, Boundaries of the Coastal
Zone: A Survey of State Laws, 1 COASTAL ZONE MGhrr. J. 305 (1974).
92. See Wetlands, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4701-09 (1974); Mandatory Zoning and
Subdivision Control, ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 481-14 (1974); Site Location of Develop.
ment, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1973); Oil Discharge Prevention and
Pollution Control, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, 99 541-57 (Supp. 1973).
93. See notes 18-26 supra & accompanying text.
94. The four case studies only illustrate key facility-development projects containing
federal-state relations issues; they are not prototypes of all coastal zone developments. As
coastal zone management programs evolve, conclusions as to their utility in solving federal-
state relations problems can be assessed more accurately.
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cies in the statutory basis for the shorelines program. Perhaps be-
cause the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission was
established as the result of an initiative in which oil-related issues
were prominent, 5 that state's coastal management program is ag-
gressively involved- in articulating the state's view of OCS develop-
ment and in framing the technical and policy issues that will be the
subject of federal-state negotiations. The fact that deepwater port
planning has outpaced general planning for coastal zone manage-
ment in Louisiana undoubtedly reflects executive and legislative
priorities in that state and suggests that the future of coastal zone
management may depend upon the ability of the program to accom-
modate the existing Environmental Protection Plan and the
impact-mitigation provisions of the Deepwater Ports Act. On the
East Coast, the long history of special-purpose legislation for coastal
areas and the current impetus for creation of new institutions for
energy-related problems"6 creates only a cautious optimism about
the likely role of coastal zone management programs.
These differences reflect an uncertainty that coastal management
programs can deal adequately with such large developments. For
example, it could be argued that coastal management programs are
inappropriate vehicles for the review of major energy facilities since
such facilities demand specialized attention because of their size
and complexity, because of their impacts outside the coastal zone,
and because of the involvement of issues, such as the effect of rate
structure upon demand, that normally are beyond the scope of
coastal zone management. The State of Washington apparently has
accepted this argument since it has expressed a desire to shift au-
thority for power plant siting to the newly created Thermal Power
Plant Site Evaluation Council.,' California, on the other hand, has
suggested concurrent jurisdiction for its coastal management pro-
gram and its new Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Commission over environmental and land use aspects of coastal
95. See Healy, Saving California's Coast: The Coastal Zone Initiative and Its Aftermath,
1 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 365, 365-67 (1974).
96. See CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 25000-25903 (West Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§
7001-13 (1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:3101-16 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1
to -21 (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 46-23-1 to -12 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 80.50.030 (Supp. 1974).
97. State of Washington, Coastal Zone Management Program Application to the Secretary
of Commerce for Approval Under Section 306 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,
Feb. 14, 1975, at 54.
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zone facilities." The California approach of retaining within the
coastal agency those aspects of a siting question that are important
to the coastal management program generally, even though another
agency might have equal or ultimate authority, appears to assure
the comprehensiveness necessary to achieve objectives for the entire
coastal zone."
A second observation fom the four state experiences concerns the
emergence of some important themes for resolving federal-state is-
sues. For example, it appears that the specificity and comprehensi-
veness of the statement of the issues may aid in their resolution. In
contrast to the clear and complete articulation of state concerns in
California and Louisiana, the East Coast states have not yet devel-
oped common goals for OCS development and the Shorelines Man-
agement program in Washington State lacks even the legal basis for
confronting the Navy in order to define the relevant issues.
Another emerging theme concerns the state's organization to deal
with federal-state issues. Having established a specific state agency
that is solely responsible for deepwater port development, Louisiana
thus has a single forum for clarifying federal-state relations as ques-
tions arise. Washington also has such an agency, but it lacks ade-
quate statutory guidance. California has only a temporary agency
under a coastal management plan that has yet to obtain final ap-
proval. While the East Coast states are developing new energy of-
fices, the important interstate relationships have not yet developed
sufficiently to permit clear delineation of objectives for federal-state
relations.
Perhaps the most important theme for the resolution of federal-
state relations concerns the competence, in terms of legal authority
under law or in terms of technical capacity, of a particular agency
or governmental level to'decide an issue. Louisiana, for example, is
authorized under its laws to deal with environmental impact ques-
tions affecting the routing of petroleum product pipelines within its
98. California Plan, supra note 50, at 200-01.
99. The Director of the Office of Coastal Zone Management has indicated that his office
actively will seek the participation of coastal zone management programs in future energy
facility-siting and impact issues since to carve energy issues out of coastal zone management
would undercut the comprehensiveness that is to be one of the strengths of coastal zone
management. Closing remarks of Robert Knecht, Third National Coastal Zone Management
Conference, Asilomar, Cal., May 30, 1975.
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jurisdiction,' 0 while federal legislation is unclear on the matter.",1
Likewise, through extensive and detailed environmental study,' 2
Louisiana's Offshore Terminal Authority has acquired the technical
capacity for pipeline routing. By contrast, legal authorization is
unclear for the State of Washington to determine shoreline and
submerged land uses involving federal installations: federal agen-
cies are not required to obtain shoreline permits from the local gov-
ernments or the state, and no statewide master plan for areas out-
side the competence of local governments is required.
This lack of legal authorization is particularly detrimental be-
cause technical capacity for different aspects of the Trident base is
divided, the Navy having expertise concerning the requirements for
nuclear submarine deployment while only state and local agencies
and interests are competent to deal with such questions as the visual
amenities of the shore, local environmental impacts, and recreation
patterns. Technical capacity depends upon the information avail-
able at each level of government and the credibility regarding the
motivation and perspective of each level: Kitsap County in Wash-
ington normally would not have the information needed to select an
East or West Coast site for a nuclear submarine base, and any claim
by the Navy to know local aesthetic and recreation preferences
would lack credibility. Technical capacity also would vary accord-
ing to the particular step in the decisionmaking process; federal or
state agencies might have greater capabilities in particular areas
such as gathering environmental information, soliciting public opin-
ion, engaging experts, or formulating objectives.' 3
These three themes, clarity of issues, state organization, and deci-
sionmaking competence, may indicate an approach to the proper
allocation of responsibilities in federal-state relations. Delineation
of the issues involved in a controversy such as that surrounding the
Trident submarine base, identification of the structures available to
100. State of Louisiana Deep Draft Harbor and Terminal Authority, supra note 62, at 3-1,
4-1.
101. For example, the Office of Pipeline Safety in the Department of Transportation is in
a dispute with the Federal Power Commission over regulation of interstate pipelines within
the three-mile limit. L. Mallon, Offshore Oil Drilling and Onshore Impact: The Legal/
Institutional Framework 9-10 (University of Miami Ocean and Coastal Law Program Rep.
No. FY75-5, 1974).
102. See, eg., Stone & Robbins, Recommendations for the Environmental Protection Plan
(Louisiana Superport Studies Rep. No. 3, 1973).
103. Robert F. Goodwin is responsible for noting that competency may differ according to
the stage of the decisionmaking process. Personal communication to author.
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resolve such issues, and an allocation of issues according to the legal
and technical competence of the different structures could resolve
at least some aspects of federal-state relations.
A third observation is that state coastal zone programs need pro-
cedures and techniques for utilizing these themes to resolve particu-
lar federal-state issues as they arise. At the heart of this need is the
definition and operation of the national-interest and federal-
consistency clauses of the Coastal Zone Management Act. Research
is underway to find judicial precedent for interpreting the operative
terms of these clauses, terms such as "consistency," "national inter-
est," and "to the maximum extent practicable." ' Moreover, the
inevitable litigation that will arise from CZMA implementation ul-
timately will assist the resolution of federal-state relations. The
need to initiate the state programs and effectuate the Act's require-
ment for coordination and cooperation among levels of govern-
ment, "I however, will preclude awaiting extensive judicial construc-
tion of the Act. The Act encourages state coordination with federal
agencies through its requirement that the national interest be con-
sidered in coastal management,"' and it encourages federal coopera-
tion through the requirement that federal agency actions accord
with state plans and through its provision for federal agency review
of state programs prior to approval.1 An ongoing coordination pro-
cess will be necessary because the range of potential federal-state
conflicts is too great for any proposed state program to address them
all specifically. Accordingly the following factors should be integral
to the federal-state coordination requirements of the Coastal Zone
Management Act.
First, an ongoing coordination process should be developed by
each state coastal management program as a visible subprogram
under the direction of a responsible state official and staffed by at
least one full-time employee. The coordination program should reg-
ularly consider both national-interest and federal-consistency ques-
104. Statement of William Brewer, General Counsel of the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, Meeting of the Coastal Zone Management Advisory Committee, New
Orleans, Mar. 7, 1975. The research is being conducted within the General Counsel's office.
Id.
105. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451(h), 1452(c), (d), 1454(b), (c), 1455(c)(1), (2), 1455(d), 1456(a)-(e)
(Supp. II, 1972).
106. Id. §§ 1455(c)(8); 40 Fed. Reg. 1688 (1975).
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(b) (Supp. IF, 1972); 40 Fed. Reg. 8546-48 (1975) (interim regulations
for mediation of federal-state disputes).
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tions and be sufficiently flexible to respond to federal-state prob-
lems at their earliest stage. It is important that the effort be ongoing
to build experience and expertise for these special kinds of intergov-
ernmental problems.
Second, the coordination process should be housed outside the
units of government making primary decisions on coastal uses in
order to minimize advocacy of particular views and enjoy maximum
credibility for objective decisionmaking. Those units of government
making primary decisions should be involved in the coordination
but not be responsible for the overall coordination process. Thus, if
local government makes the primary determination of permissible
uses, the coordination process should be outside the local govern-
ment. Similarly, if particular issues are handled by a special func-
tion agency such as a wetlands office, coordination should be out-
side of that particular resource agency.
Third, techniques for early identification of the federal-
consistency and national-interest problems must be developed.'
Identification of these problems should begin even before approval
of the coastal management program. Once a particular federal-state
problem has been identified, it should be brought to the attention
of any affected parties. Early identification of problems would be
facilitated by maintaining a list of potential federal agency actions
and programs which would require federal consistency pursuant to
the CZMA: those actions "conducted or supported" by federal agen-
cies which might affect the coastal zone of the state and those fed-
eral development projects occurring within the coastal zone of the
state.' 9 Further the coordination office should have methods for
learning of all state and local grant requests and applications for
federal licenses and permits affecting the coastal zone.
Fourth, particular federal-state relations issues should be divided
into subparts. Large development projects which raise federal-
consistency and national-interest problems are not likely to be de-
cided fully by one level of government; instead there are likely to
be many levels of decision, many different issues to be decided, and
108. Reliance upon the A-95 review process may be unsatisfactory because it may provide
notice of a proposed federal project only 60 days before the federal decision is made. See note
33 supra. The A-95 review process was established to facilitate the general coordination and
consistency provisions in the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4231
(1970), and the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3334 (1970).
109. See notes 23-26 supra & accompanying text.
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a lengthy decisionmaking process. Division of a major project into
its elements, such as site selection, evaluation of particular environ-
mental impacts, and development of the most appropriate design
for components, allows each party to determine his interest in each
subissue and facilitates factual evaluation of each subissue. Particu-
larization of subissues also may reveal the relative significance and
range of consequences flowing from certain decisions, thereby indi-
cating the degree of national interest in them.
Fifth, the legal and technical competence of particular agencies
to decide subissues must be the subject of a conference among the
federal and state agencies. The legal competence should be ad-
dressed from the standpoint of clarifying law and regulations to find
criteria for a decision1 and to identify differences among the laws
and policies of state and federal agencies. Such an issue-
development conference also should address technical competence
for particular subissues. These considerations of legal and technical
competence between federal and state agencies may not in them-
selves solve problems, but they may encourage more objective and
informed allocation of decisions among the various agencies.
Sixth, the state should determine the subissues for which federal-
consistency requirements should be stressed if agreement is not pos-
sible inasmuch as the state controls the consistency procedures.111
Drawing upon analysis of legal and technical competence, the state
should develop guidelines for this determination. For example, if a
particular subissue affects interests outside the state's jurisdiction
and the legal and technical competence to decide the issue rests
primarily with the federal agency, then the state should not press
federal-consistency requirements but incorporate the federal view of
that particular subissue into the coastal management program.
Guidelines for specific sets of issues such as fishing, dredging, or
pipeline routing, would of course be more useful in practice than
generalized abstractions.
Seventh, the coordination process should be described and
110. The point to be developed is which law, state or federal, provides the best tools to solve
the problem, not which is paramount in the hierarchyof laws. The question of federal suprem-
acy or federal consistency need only be addressed when there is clear conflict on a discrete
subissue.
111. Although the Secretary of Commerce has the authority to permit actions that the state
would disallow, the state can control the procedures for determining consistency, and it
decides whether a proposed action is consistent with its plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1458(c)(3) (Supp.
11, 1972).
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reported for future reference as a precedent for handling similar
issues. An analysis of coordination "cases" may be a source of guide-
lines for determining where federal consistency should be de-
manded, or it may aid in refining the concepts of national and state
interests in resource allocation. Further, it is part of the "learning
process" of coastal zone management through which programs can
be amended to incorporate the lessons learned.112
Neither of the state programs thus far submitted to the federal
Office of Coastal Zone Management, one from Washington'13 and
one from Maine,"' has included these or similar elements. Although
these programs are likely to serve as prototypes for other states, the
Washington program already having received preliminary ap-
proval, "5 they do not provide adequate mechanisms for federal-state
coordination, perhaps because of the paucity of guidance available
when the programs were drafted,"
Neither state application provides adequate methods for coordi-
nating federal and state interests despite the fact that both states
characterized federal-state coordination as an ongoing process in
order to justify not resolving specific substantive problems prior to
approval of the program.117 Neither state clearly assigns specific
112. Id. § 1455(g).
113. State of Washington, Coastal Zone Management Program Application to the Secre-
tary of Commerce for Approval Under Section 306 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of
1972, Feb. 14, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Washington Application]; U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Draft Environmental Impact Statement: Proposed Federal Approval of the Coastal Zone
Management Program, State of Washington, Mar. 21, 1975.
114. State of Maine, Revised Preliminary Application for Program Approval In Accordance
with Section 306 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Apr. 4, 1975 [hereinafter cited
as Maine Application]; U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Proposed Federal Approval of the Coastal
Zone Management Program, Mid-Coast Segment, State of Maine, Mar. 28, 1975.
115. 40 Fed. Reg. 23,778 (1975).
116. Federal guidance is only beginning to become available. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Adequate Consideration of the National Interest in Coastal Zone Management (undated
memorandum provided as guidance for interpretation of the national-interest clause); 40 Fed.
Reg. 8546-48 (1975) (proposed regulations for preapproval coordination with federal agencies).
Guidance on interpretation of the federal-consistency provisions has not yet been provided.
117. For example, Washington argued that the numerous federal-state relations questions
best could be handled on a case-by-case basis once the state's program is operational. State-
ment by Murray Walsh, Washington Dep't of Ecology, Meeting between federal and state
officials, Seattle, Apr. 18, 1975. "Our approach has been to underplay this whole area [of
potential federal-state conflict]. We intend no reversals of authority and prefer to end con-
flicts by discussion." Washington Application, supra note 113, at 83. Maine traced its recent
history of ongoing coordination with federal agencies. Maine Application, supra note 114, at
59-60.
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federal-state issues or the responsibility for federal-state coordina-
tion to particular offices.118 Neither adequately describes the ongo-
ing process of federal-state coordination, each relying generally
upon the A-95 review procedure. "' Despite the utility of the A-95
procedure for identifying potentially conflicting federal actions, it
neither establishes a mechanism for resolving conflicts nor ad-
dresses specifically the consistency requirements peculiar to the
Coastal Zone Management Act.12
The extent to which the area of potential federal-state conflicts was underplayed by Wash-
ington may be indicated by the fact that the state attempted to demonstrate its compliance
with the requirement for consideration of national interests in the drafting of its plan by
noting that the Washington coastal zone provides significant resources to the nation, that
many federal agency activities already are located in the zone, and that no facilities now are
excluded from the zone. Washington Application, supra note 113, at 53, 54. It does acknowl-
edge that exclusion may become necessary in the future and that consideration of national
and regional needs has only just begun since they can be considered during federal agency
review of local master programs. Id.
Coordination between federal agencies and the state prior to preliminary approval included
the establishment of an advisory committee, a survey of plans and needs of federal agencies,
and consultation between local governments and federal agencies. Id. at 75, 77, 81, 82, app.
A; see WASH. Rv. CoDE ANN. § 90.58.100 (Supp. 1974). Federal officials indicated dissatisfac-
tion with the consideration given to the interests of federal installations in local master
programs and with the general communication between local governments and federal agen-
cies. Meeting between federal and state officials, Seattle, Apr. 8, 1975.
118. Washington provides only that local program managers incorporate federal views in
their plans, Washington Application, supra note 113, at 77, and that the state Department
of Ecology issue certifications of federal consistency, id. at 83. A need for federal agencies to
obtain state permits "is not contemplated at all." Id.
Maine has assigned the consideration of national and regional interests to a variety of
offices, including the Governor's Task Force on Energy and Heavy Industry, the New England
River Basin Commission (NERBC), the state Board of Environmental Protection, the Com-
mission on Maine's Future, and the Acadia National Park Coordinating Committee. Maine
Application, supra note 114, at 21-22. Federal coordination and consistency issues are as-
signed to regional planning commissions (the agencies designed to coordinate technical serv-
ices and A-95 review), the executive department of the state, and NERBC. Id. at 58-60.
119. According to Washington's application, upon receipt of notices of proposed federal
actions under the A-95 review process "[the Department of Ecology] can quickly determine
the substance of the federal action, check with the local government and issue a statement
of certification or lack thereof in response to the A-95." Washington Application, supra note
113, at 65. Washington also relies upon the water quality certification procedure already
established by law. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. I, 1972).
Maine's application provides that "[tlhe A-95 clearinghouse function can provide the
methods through which state policies and plans can be brought to bear on local and regional
agencies, the individual state agencies, as well as the federal establishment." Maine Applica-
tion, supra note 114, at 58.
120. See notes 33, 108 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Tension between state and federal government over allocation of
coastal zone resources is inevitable inasmuch as both levels of gov-
ernment have sovereign power over the same land and water areas.
By means of its national-interest and federal-consistency provisions
the Coastal Zone Management Act attempts to capitalize upon this
shared concern for the coastal zone by allowing state government to
be an operative arm of national policy for allocating use of this
important resource. Experience in Washington State, California,
Louisiana, and on the East Coast suggests that effective accommo-
dation of national and state interests has not always been provided
by state coastal management programs; it also suggests, however,
that federal-state coordination can be enhanced by articulating
issues clearly, by providing a flexible state structure specifically
directed toward federal-state coordination, and by determining the
legal and technical competence of the federal and state agencies to
decide the various subissues of any major resource allocation. The
absence of adequate measures for ongoing federal-state coordina-
tion in the applications thus far submitted to the federal Office of
Coastal Zone Management is particularly ominous because those
applications are likely to be prototypes for other state programs.
Because the range of potential conflicts between state and federal
agencies is incalculable, reliance upon the incorporation of an ongo-
ing coordination process into state coastal management programs is
more feasible than any attempt to resolve all conflicts before the
programs receive federal approval. Because the federal agencies will
have the burden of demonstrating the consistency of their projects
with those programs after approval, however, it is incumbent upon
the federal agencies to ensure that the coordination process will be
adequate to accommodate the conflicting interests. If federal agen-
cies do review state programs carefully from such a perspective prior
to approval, states are likely to find that expeditious approval of
their programs will be dependent upon a clear articulation of spe-
cific coordination measures. Both federal agencies and states there-
fore would be 'aided by early promulgation of regulations regarding
the CZMA's federal-consistency provisions by the Office of Coastal
Zone Management.
[Vol. 16:747
